Kendra's Law Narrowly Interpreted
A Queens justice has directed that pleading requirements be strictly observed before court-ordered treatment will be imposed upon mentally ill persons under the eight-month-old Kendra's Law.
Citing the lack of specific details and identification of the source of information, Justice Patricia A. Satterfield declined to force a mentally ill man to undergo "assisted outpatient treatment."
Justice Satterfield, in Matter of Sullivan (Jesus A.), 500365/00, signed June 12 in Supreme Court, Queens County, IA Part 51M, denied the petition brought by Dr. Ann Sullivan, director of the Department of Psychiatry at Elmhurst Hospital Center. The doctor had sought court-ordered treatment for Jesus A. (a pseudonym), a patient at the hospital who allegedly failed to take his prescribed medications and had become violent, threatening to harm others.
Agreeing with Mr. A.'s counsel, Israel Flamenbaum of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service of the Appellate Division, Second Department, the judge said the petition did not state facts to support the hospital's belief that Mr. A. met the criteria for assisted outpatient treatment as stated in Kendra's Law, S9.60 of New York's Mental Hygiene Law.
Under the law, a patient may be ordered to obtain assisted outpatient treatment if a court finds that the patient has a history of failing to comply with treatment for his mental illness. That failure must have been a significant factor in requiring the patient's hospitalization or detention in a local jail at least twice within the past three years, or the failure to comply with prescribed treatment must have resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward himself or others within the past four years.
'Broad, Simple' Pleading
"The specificity in pleading required under Kendra's Law is not to be taken lightly," Justice Satterfield said. The requirement that facts be stated to support the request for assisted outpatient treatment "speaks not only to due process rights, but such specificity enables the respondent to prepare and interpose a defense.
"The supporting affidavit of Dr. Victor Vasquez, which alleged without any supporting documentation or specification, that respondent 'has a long history of noncompliance with aftercare follow-up and medications which has led to physically violent behavior resulting in hospitalizations and criminal incarcerations,' was merely broad, simple, conclusory statements," the judge said.
The hospital attempted to cure the pleading by offering a supplemental affirmation, stating that Mr. A. was arrested on Aug. 26, 1999, and charged with assaulting strangers. Twice during his five-month incarceration at Rikers Island, Mr. A. was referred to the Mental Observation Unit for assaulting other inmates. "Respondent was non-compliant with medications throughout his stay at Rikers Island resulting in violent behavior, thus making him a threat to others," the doctor concluded.
The second affirmation did not cure the jurisdictional defect of the initial pleadings, Justice Satterfield said, because it did not state whether its allegations were based upon Dr. Vasquez's personal knowledge, nor did it identify the source of the information.
"This court thus does not reach the issue of whether the allegations contained in Dr. Vasquez's affirmation represent inadmissible hearsay, which may be a factor to consider on subsequent petitions," she said.
Valerie Rothman for the Law Firm of Carolyn Reinach Wolf of Great Neck appeared for the hospital on the petition.
Source: New York Law Journal, July 6, 2000.